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ABSTRACT 
 
  The paper seeks to assess how a major policy regime change – such as the introduction 
of the currency board in Bulgaria – affects the flow of bank credit to the corporate sector. An 
attempt is made to identify the determinants of corporate credit separately from the viewpoint 
of lenders and borrowers. The estimated credit supply and credit demand equations provide 
empirical evidence of important changes in microeconomic behavioral patterns which can be 
associated with the policy regime change. The results also suggest a considerable asymmetry 
in the response of credit supply and credit demand to the policy shock: while the supply shifts 
were quite pronounced, the patterns of firms’ credit demand remained fairly stable. The policy 
implications of the detected asymmetry in microeconomic adjustment are also discussed in 
the paper. 
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POLICY REGIME CHANGE AND CORPORATE CREDIT IN BULGARIA: 
ASYMMETRIC SUPPLY AND DEMAND RESPONSES  
 
1. Introduction 
  Bulgaria’s difficult transition from plan to market was marked by persistent 
macroeconomic and financial instability leading to a major economic collapse in 1996-1997. 
In 1997 a currency board arrangement (CBA) was established as a “policy of last resort” with 
the aim to impose fiscal and financial discipline. The change in the monetary regime was 
accompanied by a comprehensive package of policy reforms affecting not only the 
macroeconomic but also the institutional environment and the functioning of the financial 
system. In particular, the norms of prudential bank lending and bank supervision were 
tightened considerably; at the same time bankruptcy procedures were simplified and 
streamlined. All in all this amounted to a major policy regime change, in fact, the most 
important policy shift during the whole transition period. 
  It has been widely acknowledged that Bulgaria’s macroeconomic performance has 
changed dramatically since 1997. Macroeconomic and financial stability have been restored 
and economic activity started to recover; inflation was brought down to single-digit numbers, 
real incomes have been rising and the chronic fiscal gap has been closed. A CBA is an 
extremely rigid macroeconomic regime which hardens macro-budget constraints as it 
eliminates direct central bank credits to finance the budget deficit. It also hardens micro-
budget constraints, in the first place in the banking system, as the central bank can no longer 
engage in refinancing commercial banks. However, so far there has been relatively little 
research on how this policy regime change affects the relations between enterprises and banks 
and the flow of bank credit to the firms, and whether it helps impose hard micro-budget 
constraints in the corporate sector.  2 
This paper addresses some of the microeconomic implications of this policy regime 
change, focusing on the flows of bank credit to the enterprise sector and analysing 
independently the determinants of corporate credit from the side of lenders and borrowers. To 
this effect we use results from the recent literature to formulate and specify equations 
reflecting the motivation behind lending and borrowing decisions. These equations are 
estimated econometrically using firm level data for Bulgarian firms for the period 1995-1999. 
In analyzing the results we seek to identify changes in behavioral patterns which can be 
associated with the change in the policy regime.  
We find a considerable asymmetry in supply and demand responses. The most 
important behavioral changes took place on the supply side, reflecting adjustments in bank 
lending practices. By contrast, we observed little changes in the patterns of firms’ credit 
demand that could be associated with the policy regime change. We suggest an interpretation 
of these asymmetric supply and demand responses in terms of the outcomes of the 1997 
policy reform in the banking and enterprise sectors. 
2. The determinants of corporate credit: supply and demand aspects 
2.1. Theoretical background 
There are important distinctions and specificities in the motivation of lenders and 
borrowers to engage in this process. However, while there is a considerable body of literature 
dealing with the more general issue of corporate finance, relatively few publications deal 
directly with the motivation of credit supply and demand.  
  One strand in the literature on corporate finance focuses on the role of bank-enterprise 
relations in imperfect credit markets
1 claiming that banks are better positioned than other 
                                                 
1 In perfect markets firms are indifferent to the choice between internal or external sources of finance. Market 
imperfections such as information asymmetries, incompleteness of contracts and principal-agent problems, add a 
premium to the would-be cost of capital in a perfect market because banks incur monitoring, agency and 3 
creditors to collect relevant information on the actual state of firms (Diamond (1984), (1989); 
Mayer (1988)). Banks are motivated to establish long-term relations with their clients as this 
helps them to overcome the existing information asymmetries by providing the opportunity 
for better monitoring; consequently, this reduces lending risk and costs. In turn, firms are also 
motivated to enter into long-term relations with their creditors as lower lending risk reduces 
borrowing costs. Hence the notion of relationship banking is a relevant one both when dealing 
with credit supply and demand. Empirical studies on the topic have provided abundant 
evidence in support of the conjecture that long-term enterprise-bank relations are important 
determinants of bank lending (Cole (1998); Petersen and Rajan (1994)). 
The so called portfolio approach to credit supply (for an overview see Fase (1995)) 
starts with the assumption that banks maximize a utility function under a set of balance sheet 
constraints which allows to derive directly credit supply functions. However, the derivation 
assumes a perfect financial market while treating the private sector (comprising the corporate 
and household sectors) as one homogeneous entity. These limitations restrict the use of this 
model when trying to address the specific issues related to corporate finance in imperfect 
markets.  
The demand for any type of credit – including firm’s demand for commercial bank 
credit – can be analyzed within the context of money demand in the broader sense, an issue 
which is well developed in economic theory. One of the more specific approaches to 
corporate demand for commercial bank credit (Melitz and Pardue (1973), among others) is 
based on the assumptions that credit demand is driven by the need to adjust the firms’ balance 
                                                                                                                                                          
transaction costs. The wedge between the costs of external and internal funds is a source of financial pressure for 
the firms and may give rise to adverse selection and credit rationing on capital markets (Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981); Hubbard (1998)). Imperfect information, especially in a period of financial distress, may also induce 
adverse selection due to the failure by the creditors to distinguish between viable and unviable firms (Mayer, 
(1998)). 4 
sheets in accordance with the changes (including anticipated ones) in firms’ assets. Depending 
on the maturity structure of the asset side, firms may have a preference towards financing 
them with liabilities of a matching, or relevant, maturity structure. In this scheme, the demand 
for corporate credit plays a special role as it sometimes may also serve as a buffer towards a 
desired maturity structure. 
One of our main goals in analysing the flows of corporate credit is to trace the effect 
of a policy shock, such as the introduction of the CBA on the determinants of these flows. 
The theoretical literature suggests that policy may have an effect on credit supply and demand 
in various ways. Thus changes in monetary policy do affect banks’ and firms’ behavior due to 
the existence of a transmission mechanism through which monetary shocks affect real 
economic performance. The more traditional view of a money channel (or interest rate 
transmission mechanism) implies that monetary shocks affect the economy through their 
effect on interest rates (the cost of credit), which is basically a demand effect. Thus a 
monetary contraction results in higher cost of (short-term) credit which causes the demand for 
credit to fall; in turn, given that financial markets are imperfect, the lower inflow of financial 
resources, affects firms’ performance. The recently advanced “credit channel view” implies 
that monetary policy shocks affect real economic performance through the supply of credit by 
financial intermediaries due to shifts in the supply schedule of the latter. In turn, the literature 
makes a distinction between a “bank lending channel” which pertains to banks only and is 
related to their dual nature of holders of deposits and generators of loans to firms and a “broad 
credit channel” which treats the supply of external funds to firms by all financial 
intermediaries (Oliner and Rudebusch (1996); Hu (1999)).  
The credit channel view is also consistent with the assumption of the existence of 
market imperfections, in particular, information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
which give rise to the above mentioned monitoring cost premium (Gertler (1988); Hubbard, 5 
(1995)). One implication of the existence of a credit channel in the monetary transmission 
mechanism is that it induces a heterogeneous response both of the credit market and of the 
firms due to which the increase in the cost premium for external finance will not be uniformly 
distributed across firms. The reason for this heterogeneity is the fact that the existing credit 
market imperfections are likely to impact in a different manner on various categories of firms 
in the event of a monetary shock. In particular, the credit channel view is consistent with the 
empirical finding that the effect of a monetary shock should be more severe for small firms 
(that are more likely to face information costs) than for large firms (Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1996)) or that the negative effect of a monetary contraction on investment is greater for 
highly leveraged firms (which are more likely to suffer a reduction in their collateralizable net 
worth due to the monetary shock) than for less leveraged firms (Rondi et al. (1998); Hu 
(1999)).  
Various supply and demand effects may emerge due to the existence of transition-
specific market imperfections which feature the economies undergoing transition from plan to 
market. In particular, corporate financial flows are seriously affected by the existence of “soft 
budget constraints”. Initially the term soft budget constraints was used by Kornai (1980) to 
denote paternalistic behavior on the part of the state in the ex-post bailing out of loss-making 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that found themselves in financial distress. Later, the concept 
was extended in different directions, in particular subsuming adverse selection in long-term 
banking lending under imperfect information when banks are not capable of properly 
distinguishing between profitable and unprofitable projects or, in more general terms, when 
they face ex-ante inefficiency in financing but have ex-post benefits of refinancing (Berglof 
and Roland (1998)). Having made an initial advance to an enterprise, a bank may continue 
lending, treating losses as sunk costs and believing that further lending will increase the 
overall net present value of the total investment beyond what may be realised if they stop 6 
financing the firm. A major difference between this concept and Kornai’s notion of soft 
budget constraints lies in the ex-ante attitude of creditors. While creditors (in particular, the 
state) explicitly bail out unprofitable firms (this information is available ex-ante), the adverse 
selection in the second case is due to imperfect information: if the relevant information had 
been available to the creditors ex-ante, they would have declined to finance the project 
altogether (Schaffer (1998)). In reference to long-term enterprise-bank relations in a 
transitional environment, it has been observed that relationship banking in imperfect markets 
may also involve moral hazard and may give rise to soft budget constraints for the borrowing 
firms. 
Dobrinsky et al. (2001) conjecture that some specific types of soft budget constraints 
in a transitional environment may emerge as a result of distortions in incentive structures. In 
particular, distorted incentives may have an effect both on the determinants of credit supply 
and credit demand.
2 In turn, incentive structures are a reflection of the institutional 
environment and the conduct of economic policy in the broader sense. Consequently, policy 
reforms and policy shocks can be expected to affect the determinants of credit flows both on 
the supply and the demand side. 
  The empirical research in this area is confronted with one additional difficulty, 
namely the absence of direct observations on supply and demand: observed bank lending only 
provides information on the intersection points of the supply and demand curves which is not 
sufficient to identify each of the two schedules. Most empirical studies on the issue try to 
overcome the problem by assuming a leading role of one of the two sides, usually demand. 
Other studies analyse bank credit in the broader context of enterprise finance without 
                                                 
2 For example, opportunistic behaviour on the part of banks may offset proper monitoring and screening on the 
supply side. In turn, demand patterns may be driven by survival strategies rather than by viable business 
strategies. 7 
attempting a distinction between supply and demand decisions (Cärare and Perotti (1997); 
Dobrinsky et al. (2001)). Among the few empirical studies that explicitly distinguish between 
credit supply and demand is that by Bratkowski, Grosfeld and Rostowski (2000) who analyse 
the access to bank finance by new private firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
on the basis of an enterprise survey. They overcome the above difficulty by using additional 
exogenous information: a special question in the survey inquiring about the firms’ intention to 
apply for bank credit which reflects credit demand proper. 
We use these theoretical underpinning to specify estimable equations for the supply of 
and demand for corporate credit. Since theory does not provide clues as to the possible 
structural forms of these equations we basically rely on reduced forms. Data considerations, in 
particular, the availability of relevant statistical data, also has played a certain role in the 
specification of these equations. 
In the absence of direct observations on supply and demand, observed bank lending 
only provides information on the intersection of the supply and demand curves and this is not 
sufficient to identify correctly each of the two schedules. The absence of additional 
exogenous information on the supply and demand patterns does not allow to overcome the 
ensuing simultaneity problems completely. We offer a partial solution to the problem by 
carefully specifying the two types of equation and selecting specific sets of variables 
depicting supply and demand factors. In addition we use interaction variables to partially 
offset endogeneity effects. 
2.2 Modelling credit supply 
  On the basis of the theoretical considerations outlined above, we have selected a set of 
independent variables which are conjectured to reflect supply factors, determining the 
willingness of banks to extend credit to firms. The rationale behind each such variable is 
discussed below and actual specification of the credit supply equation has the following form: 8 
 
(1)  Ci = ao + a1Ci(-1) + a2PDi + a3[Ci(-1)*PDi] + a4FCi + a5EDi + a6Si  + a7DDi + a8ODi  +εi, 
where: 
- Ci is a binary variable defining the access to bank credit. It takes the value of 1 when 
during the year there have been flows of bank credit from the banks to the firm.  
- PDi is a profitability dummy which takes values of 1 when the firm’s operational 
profitability Pi > 0 and is 0 otherwise;  
- [Ci(-1)*PDi] is an interaction variable defined as the product of the lagged value of 
Ci and the profitability dummy; 
- FCi is a fixed capital ratio defined as the share of fixed assets in the firm’s total 
assets;  
- EDi is a dummy for exporting firms. The dummy takes a value of 1 if in two out of 
the three years for which export data were available the ratio “exports/sales” was larger that a 
pre-defined threshold (30%), and is 0 otherwise; 
- Si is a size variable defined as the market share of individual firms within NACE 2-
digit sectors;  
- DDi is a delinquency dummy indicating the incidence of past financial indiscipline in 
credit service among the firms that had access to bank credit. This variable takes the value of 
1 in the case when there were incidents of payment arrears (in the sense of either principal or 
interest, or both, being in arrears) in the firms’ credit record for the previous year; 
- ODi stands for a set of dummy variables defining ownership based on four categories 
of ownership (SOEs, firms privatized to domestic investors, other domestically owned private 
firms and firms with foreign participation). 
  The rationale behind this specification of the credit supply equation is the following. 
To avoid the endogeneity and reverse causality problems (the confusion of supply and 9 
demand factors) we have tried to exclude from the supply equation variables that may reflect 
demand and may give rise to reverse causality. The backside is that the equation may be 
curtailed.  
The presence of the lagged dependent variable Ci(-1) has a dual interpretation. On the 
one hand, it reflects relationship banking in the vein of the literature discussed in section 2.1. 
Long-term enterprise-bank relations help to reduce information asymmetries; banks would be 
more willing to lend again if they have already done so (we consider the banking sector as a 
whole as the lending party). On the other hand, a positive association can be interpreted as 
evidence of soft budget constraints on the part of the banks in the sense of Berglof and Roland 
(1998). 
The rest of the variables reflect credit screening and monitoring by the banks as well 
as the credit channel hypothesis. The profitability variable is intended to capture the 
sensitivity of lending to the firm’s financial health (a test for adverse selection in bank 
lending). The operational profitability of the firm can be regarded as a measure of its viability 
so its presence allows to check whether banks are more inclined to lend to viable firms. This 
coefficient is expected to have a positive sign (the opposite can be interpreted as evidence of 
adverse selection). 
Obviously, in this case we cannot fully eliminate the identification and causality 
problem because firms’ profits/losses may affect their demand for credit as well. In order to 
circumvent this problem (at least partly) we use in addition an interaction variable between 
the profitability dummy and the lagged value of the access to credit variable. The rationale is 
to test whether long-term enterprise-bank relations are associated with the firm’s viability.  
The fixed capital ratio variable is aimed to capture the importance of collateral for the 
supply of bank credit, which is an essential aspect of bank lending in the credit channel view. 
Fixed assets can be used to collateralize bank loans and, in the case when collateral is an 10 
important determinant in banks’ decision to extend a credit, the more collateralable fixed 
assets a firm has, the more likely it would be to have access to bank credit. As, in accordance 
with the acting banking regulations in Bulgaria bank are required to take collateral, the prior 
is that, in the case of proper screening, there would be a positive association between bank 
lending and the fixed capital ratio. Size is another variable that would allow to test the credit 
channel hypothesis. The prior is that a credit squeeze is more likely to affect smaller firms. 
Several variables reflect the specificity of bank lending in a transitional environment. 
Ownership is assumed to be associated with governance and thus should capture the way 
governance affects banks’ lending decisions. The presence of the delinquency variable is 
intended to capture the incidence of “soft lending” and/or distorted incentives in lending: 
whether and how a history of financial indiscipline by the firms in their past borrowing affects 
subsequent bank lending to these firms. The export variable is intended to check whether 
exporting firms have higher credibility as borrowers of bank credit (which is the prior).  
2.3 Modelling the demand for corporate credit 
The specification of the credit demand equation is based on a generally defined money 
demand function extended with in accordance with the conceptual approach outlined above. 
The demand for credit in general, as a form of money demand, can be assumed to depend on 
two main variables: the income or activity level and the cost of credit. In accordance with the 
discussion in section 2.1, we augment this basic specification with variables mirroring the 
adjustments in the firms’ balance sheets as well as such related to the specifics of this type of 
financial flows. The actual specification of the credit demand equation is as follows (its 
justification is discussed below): 
 
(2)  Ci = ao + a1 Ci (-1) + a2 YDi + a3 (YDi * Largei) + a4 (YDi * ODi) + a5 IDi +  
+ a6 (IDi * Largei) + a7 (IDi * ODi) + a8 IvDi + a9 (IvDi * Largei) + a10 (IvDi * ODi) +  11 
+ a11 PDi + a12 LDi + a13 (PDi *LDi ) + a14 DRi + a15 Rj + εi, 
where: 
- Ci is the same binary variable as specified above.  
- YDi is an income or activity dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the change 
of real sales over two subsequent years is positive (growing firms), and is 0 otherwise.  
-  Largei is a dummy variable for large firms. Three criteria are used for the 
classification by size: total sales, total assets and employed labor. First the firms are broken 
down into three subgroups by each of these criteria. For the final classification a firm is 
defined as “large” (the dummy takes a value of 1) if it satisfies at least two of the three 
criteria.  
- IDi is a dummy for firms actively investing in fixed assets.
3 It takes the value of 1 
either if the ratio of investment to sales in a given year is larger than the same ratio in the 
previous year (firms with a growing investment share) or if the share of investment to sales is 
greater than a pre-defined threshold (10% in our case), and is 0 otherwise. The idea behind 
this definition is to identify those firms whose investment pattern in the given year is likely to 
instigate demand for external finance, and we define two such categories of firms: 1) firms 
whose investment pattern changes compared to the previous year; 2) firms with relatively 
high levels of investment activity compared to other firms. 
- IvDi is a second investment dummy variable reflecting investment in inventories. It 
takes the value of 1 if the ratio of inventories to sales in a given year is larger than the same 
ratio in the previous year (firms with a growing inventory share), and is 0 otherwise.  
- ODi is the above specified set of ownership dummy variables.  
- PDi is the profitability dummy specified above. 
                                                 
3 Due to the underdeveloped capital market, investment in financial assets by Bulgarian firms was virtually 
negligible. 12 
-  LDi is a dummy for firms facing liquidity constraints. The liquidity constraint 
dummy is constructed as follows: it takes a value of 1 if the firm’s quick ratio (the ratio 
between the sum of accounts receivable and liquid assets to the firm’s current liabilities) is 
smaller than 1 (the critical level of the quick ratio) in the given year and is 0 otherwise.  
- DRi is a variable reflecting the firm’s leverage, defined as the share of long-term debt 
in the firm’s total assets. 
- Rj is a sector-specific real interest rate defined as the average annual nominal interest 
rate on bank credit discounted by the sector-specific producer price index (defined at the 
NACE 2-digit level). 
  The rationale behind this specification of the credit demand equation is as follows. We 
do not have information about which firms actually asked for credit but only about those that 
actually received it. Similarly to the credit supply equation, in order to avoid endogeneity 
problems we have tried to exclude from the demand equation variables that may reflect 
demand and may give rise to reverse causality.  
  In this case, similarly to credit supply, we also use the lagged value of Ci but in this 
case it is intended to capture habit persistence in credit demand. Admittedly, in this case the 
reverse causality issue cannot be fully eliminated. YDi, IDi and IvDi are activity variables 
which seek to reflect the effect on demand for external finance of a general expansion of 
business activity and/or investment activity. The prior is for a strong positive association; a 
weak statistical association between the dependent variable and these activity variables would 
suggest the presence of distorted or perverse incentives (the demand for external funds is not 
based on viable business and investment projects). In addition to using the activity variables 
separately, we also interact them with size and ownership variables to account for possible 
heterogeneity in credit demand among various categories of firms. 13 
PDi and LDi are aimed at testing the incidence of adverse selection: whether firms in 
poor financial health and/or facing liquidity constraints are more likely to seek and get access 
to bank credit. In the case of the liquidity dummy there is no ambiguity about the causality 
and the interpretation of the results in terms of adverse selection. However, in the case of the 
profitability dummy, again we cannot fully eliminate the endogeneity problem because – as 
mentioned before – firm’s profit/loss position may affect also bank’s decision to extend the 
loan. In order to get around the reverse causality issue and be able to capture the incidence of 
adverse selection with respect to PDi  we use the interaction variable (PDi *LDi) which 
combines the profitability dummy with the variable related to financial strain.  
The leverage variable DRi seeks to identify statistical association between the demand 
for credit and indebtedness. The prior is that heavily indebted firms may be subject to 
financial strain due to high servicing costs which may lead them to seek new credit. In turn, if 
heavily indebted firms are more likely to get credit – which would be revealed by a positive 
statistical association – this may be an indication of the incidence of soft budget constraints 
on the part of the banks in the sense of Berglof and Roland (1998).
4  
  We have also included in the credit demand equation the variable Rj, the sector-
specific real interest rate on bank credit.
5 The rationale is the following. Due to the nature of 
transition from plan to market, during the period we are analysing, there has been 
considerable realignment of relative prices across sectors of economic activity. Consequently, 
firms belonging to different branches have been facing de facto different real costs of bank 
credit which may have affected their demand for bank loans. 
                                                 
4 Obviously in this case we also have interference of supply and demand factors; however in this case the main 
driving push definitely comes from the demand side. 
5 When we estimate the credit equation using annual cross-section data, it is not possible to include the interest 
rate proper in the equation as it is a constant. 14 
3. Empirical analysis of corporate credit under a policy regime change 
  The arguments outlined above suggest that a major policy shock such as the policy 
reforms that accompanied the introduction of the CBA in Bulgaria should have considerable 
repercussions on the flow of bank credit to the corporate sector. In the first place, the regime 
change in monetary policy (which, among other things, eliminated direct central bank 
refinancing of the banking system) is likely to have affected bank lending through both the 
money and credit channels. Secondly, the important institutional and legislative changes can 
be expected to have had a strong effect on incentive structures in the banking and enterprise 
sectors, thus affecting both the supply and the demand side. However uncovering the actual 
changes at the microeconomic level – such as the changes in borrowing and lending practices 
– essentially remains an empirical issue. For this purpose we estimate the specified credit 
supply and credit demand equations.  
  The prior is that the policy shock affected the underlying structural relations governing 
the supply of and demand for bank credit. Accordingly, these changes can be expected to 
show up in the parameters of the reduced form supply and demand equations. Hence our 
research strategy is to estimate these equations for individual years (those before and after the 
policy regime change) – rather than for the period as a whole – and to trace and analyze the 
changes in the estimated parameters. 
The empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive enterprise data set covering 
corporate entities that report to the National Statistical Institute using the double entry 
accounting method. The number of firms covered in this analysis for the period 1995-1999 15 
varies from some 8,400 firms in 1994 to more than 28,000 firms in 1999. Table 1 shows some 
descriptive statistics for the sample for firms used in the estimation.
6  
(table 1 here) 
To take into account the behavioral impact of corporate governance we differentiate 
between four ownership categories of firms: 1) SOEs; 2) Firms privatized to domestic 
investors (former SOEs, in which domestic investors hold a majority stake at the moment of 
reporting, and there is no foreign participation); 3) Other domestically owned private firms 
(mostly  de novo private firms), and 4) Firms with foreign participation (these are either 
privatized or de novo firms; foreign investors may not have a majority stake).  
The second and the third panels of table 1 reflect the firms’ access to bank credit. 
These data provide evidence of a general credit crunch in the years immediately following the 
introduction of the currency board caused by a withdrawal of the banks from lending to the 
corporate sector. The evidence of changes in corporate performance in this descriptive 
statistics is mixed. Thus average profitability was on the decline after 1997 while in terms of 
sales growth, after an improvement in 1998 the situation deteriorated again in 1999. On the 
other hand, there was a marked improvement in financial discipline: the share of firms with 
arrears on bank credit rapidly declined after 1997 (the sixth panel). 
3.1 Credit supply 
The estimation results for this equation are presented in table 2. The equations were 
estimated for each year from 1995 to 1999 using probit techniques. The Wald tests for 
structural break for two subsequent years are highly significant suggesting instability of the 
estimated relationship over time, a result that provides support for the approach based on 
                                                 
6 Due to the data requirements of the specified equations some firms form the data base had to be dropped from 
the estimation. Table 1 reports only the data for those firms that contain the full statistical information used in 
the estimation of the credit supply and demand equations. 16 
single year (rather than panel) estimations. The results of this test are also consistent with the 
conjecture of ongoing changes in behavioral patterns during the period that we scrutinize.  
(table 2 here) 
In general, the estimation results are quite in line with the expectations based on 
theoretical considerations; in addition they provide evidence of significant changes in the 
motivation of bank lending which accompany the change in the policy regime.  
The estimated coefficients can be divided in two groups, depending on their stability 
over time. The first group consists of coefficients reflecting relative stability of the underlying 
relations during this period. The estimation results highlight the importance of relationship 
banking: the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant; its 
absolute value also suggests that long term enterprise-bank relations are among the important 
determinant of the supply of bank credit. On the other hand, as noted above, this result may 
also be interpreted as evidence of the persistence of soft budget constraints. Another 
coefficient that is always estimated as positive and highly statistically significant is size. This 
is also in line with the prior that large firms are more likely to have access to bank credit than 
smaller firms and is consistent with the credit channel hypothesis. The estimation results also 
indicate that exporting firms are more likely to have access to bank credit than those that only 
operate on the domestic market: with the exception of the results for 1997 this coefficient is 
also estimated as positive and highly significant.  
The profitability coefficient is also positive in all years but its statistical significance 
declines somewhat in the last two years; the estimated coefficient also declines in absolute 
value. However, counter to expectations, the coefficient of the interaction variable between 
relationship banking and viability was not estimated as statistically significant. This might 
suggests that while long-term enterprise-bank relations do matter for banks’ decisions (as it 
follows from the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable), the allocation of 17 
credit to firms with such relations was not necessarily associated with their present 
profitability. The combination of these results implies that while profitability – hence viability 
– does affect bank lending (overall these results are in line with expectations), its effect is 
somewhat ambiguous and is probably not always of prime importance as a determinant of 
bank lending.  
For the rest of the coefficients, there is a considerable variation in the course of the 
period. On the whole the estimation results suggest changes in some aspects of bank lending 
behavior roughly occurring in 1997 and thus coinciding with the introduction of the currency 
board. For example, the ownership dummies for all categories of private firms after 1998 are 
estimated as positive and highly significant which is not the case in the first three years: in the 
beginning of the period some of these coefficients are negative, although not statistically 
significant. These results imply that after the policy regime change banks were much more 
inclined to lend to non-state-owned firms than they were in the past.  
One of the important indications of a change in the patterns of bank lending is the 
estimated coefficient of the delinquency dummy. In the years 1995-1998 this coefficient is 
positive but in the first three years it is not statistically significant. However, in 1999 it 
changes sign and is estimated as highly significant (indicating that past incidence of financial 
indiscipline in the servicing of bank credit was negatively associated with the access to bank 
credit in that year). This suggests that banks started to pay much greater attention to the past 
credit history, a pattern that was not observable in the past.
7 Another indication of change is 
the dynamics of the coefficients of the fixed capital ratio. From being insignificant in the 
initial two years they turn into positive and highly significant in the last three years indicating 
                                                 
7 As to the positive and significant coefficient in 1998, this might be a ramification of the bank crisis when a 
large number of banks were closed; as a result firms were switching to new banks and the latter might not have 
been able to perform proper screening. 18 
that the availability of collateral has become a more important determinant of bank lending 
decisions. Moreover, these changes can be interpreted as an improvement in credit screening 
as banks became more stringent in implementing the existing regulations. 
One of the important outcomes of this series of estimations is the value of the 
estimated intercept of the equation. As can be visibly traced, in the last two years (1998 and 
1999), the value of this coefficient declined considerably compared to the beginning of the 
period. Such a change is equivalent to a shift-cum-change-in-slope of the credit supply 
schedule after the introduction of the CBA and is another piece of evidence of a change in 
bank lending behavior. This result, mirroring the credit crunch by the banks in response to the 
policy shock, is also consistent with the credit channel hypothesis. 
In summary, as a result of the policy regime change banks generally became more 
reluctant to lend to the corporate sector but they were more likely to lend to private firms than 
to SOEs. At the same time, they continued to be more inclined to lend to firms with long-term 
enterprise-bank relations, to large and to exporting firms. Profitability did not seem to be a 
prime determinant of bank lending in Bulgaria either before or after the introduction of the 
CBA. We also find evidence of a change in bank lending toward better credit screening: firms 
with a record of financial indiscipline were less likely to get access to bank credit in the end 
of the period; banks also started to put a greater emphasis on collateral. 
3.2 Credit demand 
  The estimation results for the credit demand equation are presented in table 3. 
Similarly to the case of credit supply, and given the evidence of structural break across time, 
these equations were estimated separately for each year from 1995 to 1999 using probit 
techniques.  
(table 3 here) 19 
  The lagged dependent variable – which in this case we interpret as habit persistence – 
is again one of the important determinant of financing decisions. This is not a surprising 
outcome when regarded from the demand side of corporate credit, especially as concerns 
short-term capital. As the production cycle within a firm has a repetitive character, once a 
firm establishes a cycle involving borrowing (say, to finance working capital), this pattern is 
likely to repeat itself over the next cycles.  
  The estimated coefficients of the activity variables generally match the prior outlined 
above. Indeed, most of the estimated “pure” (non-interacted) coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant for all the three activity variables. The coefficients of the non-
interacted activity variables are in line with the prior and do not reveal any abnormal demand 
patterns for the sample of firms taken as a whole. However, the two types of interaction 
variables which are used in conjunction with the activity variables highlight some important 
nuances of credit demand for certain categories of firms. Thus large firms display specific 
patterns of credit demand with respect to some of the activity variables. Within this category, 
the statistical association of credit demand with the growth of sales is considerably stronger 
than that for the sample as a whole; by contrast, the reverse is true with respect to investment 
in fixed assets.  
SOEs is the one category of firms that has distinctly different patterns of credit 
demand compared with other ownership categories.
8 Moreover, there is strong evidence of 
distortions and deviations from the prior in the demand patterns of SOEs. For example, in the 
case of SOEs there is a systematic negative association between growth of sales and demand 
for credit; for the second half of the period the same is valid for the growth in inventories. The 
association between investment in fixed assets and credit demand is generally also negative, 
but not always statistically significant. These findings are indicative of persistent, perverse 
                                                 
8 Most of the coefficients for the other ownership categories turned out to be statistically insignificant. 20 
patterns of behavior among SOEs where credit demand is likely driven by survival motives 
rather than by the expansion of activity. 
  Apart from this case, however, we do not find strong evidence of adverse selection. 
The profitability dummy in most cases is positive and statistically significant; in the few cases 
of negative signs, the coefficients are not statistically significant. The coefficient of the 
liquidity dummy is, as expected, positive and in most cases statistically significant. The 
interaction of profitability and liquidity reveals one important change taking place over the 
period 1995-1999. In the first year the coefficient of this variable is negative which is a sign 
of adverse selection (credit going to loss-making firms facing liquidity constraints). However, 
it turns positive and highly significant in the last two years reversing the above pattern. 
Leverage, as measured by the long-term debt ratio, is also positively associated with credit 
demand and over time the link strengthens in the last two years. 
  The negative implications of the emergence of differentials in real interest rates due to 
realignments in relative prices is highlighted by the estimated coefficients of the sectoral real 
interest rate variable. Until 1997 (the period of high inflation) the coefficient of this variable 
is negative and statistically significant but in the years after (when inflation subsided to very 
low levels) it becomes statistically insignificant. This outcome points to one specific 
damaging impact of high inflation, namely its distortive effect on relative prices due to their 
differential speed of adjustment. In turn, this creates additional borrowing difficulties for the 
firms with a relatively slow price adjustment due to the implied effect on real interest rates.  
  It is worth noting that unlike the case of credit supply the estimated parameters of the 
credit demand equation (in particular, the intercept) do not hint at a systematic downward 
shift in the demand schedule. There was probably a one-off shift taking place in 1997 (the 
year when the CBA was introduced) but it is difficult to trace such changes during the rest of 
the period. 21 
  In summary, the estimated credit demand equations reveal significantly less signs of 
change in the patterns of microeconomic behavior than the credit supply equation. Although 
the Wald test indicates that there was structural change in the underlying relationship over 
time, we do not observe reversals of signs or significant changes of the values of important 
coefficients as is the case in the supply equation. In the main, the signs and values of the 
coefficients of the estimated demand equation reflect relatively stable credit demand patterns 
over the whole period. Only in one case (the interaction of profitability and liquidity and the 
sectoral real interest rate) it is possible to trace an obvious reversal of previous patterns. These 
results suggest important differences in the adjustment of the banking and enterprise sectors 
following the introduction of the CBA. 
  4. Discussion and conclusions 
The methodology suggested in this paper aims at studying separately the determinants 
of corporate credit from the viewpoint of lenders and borrowers. The suggested credit supply 
and demand equations are based on findings in the recent theoretical literature on corporate 
finance in imperfect financial markets. This empirical application of this methodology enables 
us to analyze separately the patterns of lending and borrowing in Bulgaria and to trace the 
adjustments on the two sides following a major policy regime change such as the introduction 
of the CBA in 1997.  In our empirical analysis we first check the conformity of our estimation 
results with the theoretical background but then also seek to detect behavioral changes that 
can be associated with the policy shock and to highlight the motivation and driving forces 
behind these changes. Given the nature of the transitional environment in Bulgaria, we also 
seek to highlight the importance of incentives and governance in shaping microeconomic 
behavior. 
As regards the first aspect of our research agenda, our results are broadly consistent 
with the theoretical priors, especially for the years after the policy regime change. On the 22 
supply side, the empirical results suggest that banks have a revealed preference to lend to 
firms with long-term enterprise-bank relations, to large firms and to exporting firms. These 
results are consistent with the literature on relationship banking in imperfect markets as they 
highlight the importance of monitoring and agency costs as a determinant of bank lending in 
an environment where financial markets are marred by numerous distortions and 
imperfections.  
On the whole the parameters of the estimated credit demand equations are also in 
conformity with the expectations. Our results provide evidence that expected changes in 
activity level within the firms as well as habit persistence were among the important 
determinants of credit demand of Bulgarian firms; liquidity constraints and indebtedness also 
played a role in shaping credit demand. The results also point to a segmentation of the market 
of corporate borrowers in Bulgaria which is consistent with the notion of a heterogeneous 
response to monetary shocks conjectured by the credit channel hypothesis. Thus, for example, 
we detect specificities in the credit demand patterns of large firms. In addition, the category of 
SOEs displays markedly different borrowing patterns compared to any category of private 
firms. Throughout the period SOEs’ borrowing practices are characterized by distorted 
incentives as market forces to not seem to play a leading role in motivating their borrowing 
decisions. 
As regards the second aspect of out research strategy, we find empirical evidence of 
significant changes in bank-enterprise relations that can be associated with the policy regime 
change. The finding that we consider as the most important in this respect is the detection of 
an asymmetric response of credit supply and demand to the policy shock. The estimated credit 
supply equation provides clear evidence of a change in banks’ lending patterns over the 
period 1995-1999. The results provide strong evidence of a credit crunch after the 
introduction of the CBA with banks becoming more reluctant to lend to the corporate sector. 23 
Besides, one can observe a shift in their lending preferences as they appear to be more likely 
to lend to private firms rather than to SOEs (who used to be the preferred borrowers in the 
past). We also find evidence of a change in bank lending toward better credit screening: firms 
with a record of financial indiscipline were less likely to get access to bank credit in the end 
of the period while the role of collateral in securing firm’s access to bank credit increased. 
These results suggest an increased role of the firms’ payment discipline in shaping bank 
lending decisions. In addition, while we find some evidence of distorted incentives and 
perverse lending patterns in the first years, there are considerably less signs of such patterns in 
the last years of this period.  
   Notably, the estimated credit demand equation provides much less evidence of change 
for the years after the introduction of the CBA. More generally, the policy shock does not 
seem to have triggered substantial adjustments in the firms’ credit demand patterns. 
These findings have important policy implications. The methodological framework of 
our analysis suggests that the adjustments in the flows of bank credit would result both from a 
monetary transmission of the macroeconomic policy shock and from changes in the 
microeconomic and institutional environment, in particular, incentive structures. On the 
supply side we find evidence of both types of adjustments. Consistent with the “bank lending 
channel” view, we detect systemic shifts and changes in the slope of the credit supply 
schedule in the years following the introduction of the CBA, which likely reflect the direct 
effect of the monetary shock. Besides, we detect behavioral changes in bank’s lending 
patterns that reflect changing incentive structures. In general, in the years after the policy 
reform the lending practices of Bulgarian banks appear to be more or less in conformity with 
the theoretical expectations for normal banking practices in market conditions (which was not 
always the case in the past). This outcome suggests that the 1997 reforms have been 
successful in triggering some necessary changes in bank’s behavior and performance. 24 
By contrast, we find no evidence of major adjustments on the demand side. While the 
absence of direct effects of the macroeconomic policy shock on enterprise performance is not 
unexpected (as in this case there is no direct monetary transmission), what is surprising is that 
we do not find notable performance- and governance-related changes in the firms’ credit 
demand patterns. Given the fact that there is abundant evidence of distorted incentives in the 
pre-CBA period (Dobrinsky et al., 2001), and the fact that financial indiscipline in the 
corporate sector was an important ingredient of the 1996-97 crisis this is a somewhat startling 
outcome as a number of reform measures undertaken in 1997 were aimed at mending the 
existing problems. Within the context of out modelling framework, this might suggest that the 
policy reform of 1997 did not generate major changes in firms’ incentive structures, at least 
what concerns their credit demand patterns until the final year of estimations (1999). 
Overall the results presented in this paper seem to offer strong empirical support to the 
conclusion that the changes in corporate credit in Bulgaria after the introduction of the CBA 
were mostly driven by the supply side. Our empirical analysis of the determinants of credit 
flows suggests an almost instantaneous supply response to the policy shock whereas we do 
not detect a discernible demand response until the end of the reference period. These 
asymmetric responses of the supply and demand side can also be interpreted in terms of 
asymmetric outcomes of the policy reforms initiated in 1997 in the banking and enterprise 
sectors. 
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Table 1. Selected descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample   
 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1. Number of firms    
SOEs 5021 4616 3248  2433  1697
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  212 280 919  1002  1280
Other domestically owned private firms  3166 9115 7747  17302  23870
Firms with foreign participation  32 614 515  843  1214
   All firms  8431 14625 12429 21580 28061
2. Share of firms with access to bank credit (% of total) 
SOEs  27.2 20.6 12.4 4.0 3.2
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  29.3 15.0 24.4  12.6  12.3
Other domestically owned private firms  40.7 15.8 17.2  7.9  7.4
Firms with foreign participation  28.1 6.7 7.8  7.1  6.9
   All firms  32.3 16.9 16.1 7.6 7.4
3. Share of firms with positive operating profit (% of total) 
SOEs 45.3 44.5 50.0  41.7  33.2
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  65.1 61.8 69.5  47.6  35.6
Other domestically owned private firms  72.5 63.6 72.3  68.9  60.9
Firms with foreign participation  68.8 57.3 63.7  62.5  54.9
   All firms  56.1 57.3 65.9 64.6 57.8
4. Share of firms with a past record of financial delinquency (% of total) 
SOEs  10.7 10.0 4.3 1.6 0.5
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  4.7 6.8 8.5  4.8  2.5
Other domestically owned private firms  7.2 3.9 2.4  1.3  0.5
Firms with foreign participation  15.6 1.5 2.1  2.7  0.7
   All firms  9.3 5.8 3.4 1.6 0.6
5. Share of firms with growing sales (% of total) 
SOEs 79.0 27.5 20.4  58.1  38.0
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  73.1 41.4 20.7  53.1  38.2
Other domestically owned private firms  82.7 43.1 28.1  53.5  41.0
Firms with foreign participation  81.3 48.5 27.4  54.0  40.4
   All firms  80.2 38.4 25.5 54.0 40.7
6. Share of firms facing liquidity constraints (% of total) 
SOEs 65.2 71.4 71.5  69.1  65.8
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  53.3 49.6 71.6  74.5  75.9
Other domestically owned private firms  51.2 61.4 65.6  55.7  53.6
Firms with foreign participation  56.3 77.4 75.7  55.2  49.5
   All firms  59.6 65.0 68.0 58.0 55.2
7. Average long-term debt ratio (% of total assets) 
SOEs  2.6 5.2 2.8 2.9 2.6
Privatized firms (domestic investors)  2.4 3.1 4.2  5.4  5.7
Other domestically owned private firms  1.7 5.2 5.2  4.0  4.6
Firms with foreign participation  14.9 10.9 7.5  7.6  9.6
   All firms  2.3 5.4 4.6 4.0 4.7
 
Source: National Statistical Institute; authors’ calculations. 28 
 
Table 2. Probit estimations of the credit supply equation, 1995-1999 
 
Dependent variable: access to bank credit (binary). 
 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1.461 1.591 1.154 0.915 1.458 
Lagged dependent variable 
[25.01]*** [30.63]*** [17.88]*** [18.87]*** [27.36]*** 
0.269 0.276 0.152 0.062 0.049 
Operating profitability (P>0) dummy 
[6.17]*** [6.59]*** [3.96]*** [1.74]*  [1.65]* 
0.091 -0.059 0.086 -0.051 0.067  Interaction between lagged dependent 
variable and profitability (P>0) dummy  [1.32] [0.95] [1.17] [0.85] [1.02] 
0.072 -0.025 0.223 0.378 0.340 
Fixed capital ratio 
[0.96] [0.40]  [3.99]***  [7.48]***  [7.58]*** 
0.345 0.295 0.076 0.358 0.169 
Dummy for exporting firms 
[5.49]*** [5.66]***  [0.89]  [6.72]*** [3.11]*** 
1.628 2.564 4.164 2.279 3.955 
Size variable (market share)  
[3.50]*** [4.46]*** [6.01]*** [4.68]*** [4.04]*** 
0.026 0.034 0.030 0.166 -0.424  Delinquency dummy (for firms with a 
record of credit arrears)   [0.45] [0.68] [0.43]  [2.14]**  [4.01]*** 
0.076 -0.204 0.395 0.530 0.634  Ownership dummy – privatized firms 
(domestic investors)  [0.73] [1.90]*  [6.79]***  [7.15]***  [7.73]*** 
0.291 -0.139 0.331 0.481 0.478  Ownership dummy – other domestically 
owned private firms  [7.95]*** [4.13]*** [8.49]*** [8.73]*** [6.89]*** 
-0.233 -0.359 -0.056 0.375  0.422  Ownership dummy – firms with foreign 
participation  [0.89] [3.70]*** [0.57] [4.25]***  [4.64]*** 
-1.409 -1.684 -1.785 -2.336 -2.311 
Constant 
[27.28]*** [34.49]*** [31.98]*** [35.88]*** [31.14]*** 
Number  of  observations  8431  14625 12429 21580 28061 
Pseudo R
2  0.269 0.281 0.159 0.108 0.165 
Test for structural break at year (t) vs. 
year (t-1) (Test statistics χ
2)    632.67*** 200.13*** 665.26*** 263.16*** 
 
 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. Probit estimations of the credit demand equation, 1995-1999 
 
Dependent variable: access to bank credit (binary). 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1.453 1.539 1.131 0.846 1.378 
Lagged dependent variable 
[42.78]*** [51.97]*** [34.06]*** [28.72]*** [41.52]*** 
0.477 -0.040 0.079 0.043 0.124 
Growth of sales dummy 
[8.46]***  [1.15] [2.08]** [1.45] [4.33]*** 
0.617 0.428 0.674 0.411 0.513  Interaction between growth of sales 
dummy and dummy for large firms  [6.91]*** [3.81]*** [4.42]*** [3.32]*** [3.13]*** 
-0.331 -0.011 -0.334 -0.281 -0.272  Interaction between growth of sales 
dummy and dummy for SOEs  [6.49]*** [0.17] [3.82]***  [3.52]***  [2.26]** 
0.276 0.286 0.456 0.063 0.138  Dummy for firms actively investing in 
fixed assets  [5.35]*** [7.43]***  [12.74]*** [1.76]*  [4.11]*** 
0.014 0.040 0.312 0.288 0.136  Interaction between investment dummy 
and dummy for large firms  [0.11]  [0.35] [2.55]** [1.27]  [0.44] 
-0.116 -0.135 -0.319 -0.214 -0.314  Interaction between investment dummy 
and dummy for SOEs  [1.64] [2.16]**  [4.62]*** [1.41]  [1.34] 
0.111 -0.108 0.219 0.145 0.265  Dummy for firms with growing investment 
in inventories  [2.31]** [3.18]*** [6.24]*** [4.94]*** [9.21]*** 
0.110 0.464 0.382 0.402 0.460  Interaction between inventory dummy and 
dummy for large firms  [0.90]  [3.95]*** [2.68]*** [3.52]*** [3.84]*** 
0.006 0.104 -0.040  -0.273  -0.346  Interaction between inventory dummy and 
dummy for SOEs  [0.10] [1.87]* [0.56]  [3.35]***  [3.60]*** 
0.445 0.150 0.141 -0.035 0.046 
Profitability dummy 
[6.66]*** [2.36]**  [1.77]*  [0.60]  [0.84] 
0.586 0.179 0.368 0.146 0.055  Dummy for firms facing liquidity 
constraints  [9.16]*** [2.98]*** [4.79]***  [2.53]**  [1.06] 
-0.241 0.132 0.013 0.139 0.154  Interaction between profitability and 
liquidity dummies   [3.12]*** [1.84]*  [0.15]  [2.06]** [2.44]** 
0.167 0.047 0.009 0.673 0.906 
Leverage (long-term debt ratio) 
[0.90] [1.31] [0.63] [19.95]***  [17.96]*** 
 -0.002  -0.020  0.001  0.001 
Sector-specific real interest rate on credit
 [3.16]***  [4.40]***  [1.12]  [0.87] 
-1.998 -1.691 -3.319 -1.917 -2.063 
Constant 
[27.74]*** [20.38]*** [10.05]*** [33.66]*** [39.06]*** 
Number  of  observations  8356  14298 12258 20746 23672 
Pseudo R
2  0.295 0.288 0.187 0.127 0.194 
Test for structural break at year (t) vs. 
year (t-1)  (Test statistics χ
2)    572.41*** 194.36*** 479.40*** 226.26*** 
 
 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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